China-EU Law Journal Humanities and social sciences
The evaluation of innovation in merger control: a comparison between china and other jurisdictions
Abstract
There are two models with which to evaluate a merger’s potential side-effects on innovation: the exogenous model and the endogenous model. The exogenous model takes innovation as an exogenous element and independently assesses this element. The endogenous model considers innovation as a competition parameter and involves it in the analysis of the competition mechanism. The key purpose of the Anti-Monopoly Law of the PRC is the “protection of fair competition”. To achieve this legislative purpose, China applies the endogenous model, appraising the concrete harm to the innovation parameter of the competition mechanism. The Chinese competition authority determines whether to evaluate harm to innovation competition based on the relevant market, merging parties, attributes of the transaction and other factors according to the specific case. Unilateral effects in horizontal mergers and input foreclosure in vertical mergers are the main theories applicable to innovation competition harm. In practice, the Chinese competition authority may differentiate between factual competition and potential competition, as well as product innovation and industry innovation, on a case-by-case basis. This paper argues that the competition authority should properly handle the uncertainty in assessing innovation competition, and fully respect the efficiency defence raised by notifying parties.