Risk governance configurations in banks: risk committees, chief risk officers, risk and performance

Afaneh, Adnan
Journal of Banking Regulation · Springer Nature · 2026-10-13 · DOI: 10.1057/s41261-026-00366-6

Аннотация

This paper examines whether two bank risk-governance mechanisms – the board risk committee and the chief risk officer – operate as separate additive mechanisms or as a governance configuration. Using a hand-collected panel of 242 listed US commercial banks over 2016–2019, the study classifies 966 bank-year observations into four states: neither mechanism, risk committee only, chief risk officer only and both. Random-effects models with bank-clustered standard errors show that banks operating both mechanisms report lower return on equity and return on assets than comparable banks with neither, while formal additivity tests remain statistically insignificant. For insolvency risk, the chief-risk-officer-only state is associated with a lower Z-score, whereas the joint state is not. The findings question the view that more risk governance is automatically better and suggest that governance architecture should be evaluated as a configuration.

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