Biological Theory История и философия науки
Multiple Realizability: Still Something After All These Years
Аннотация
Arguing about the types and tokens of neuroscience and psychology has provided philosophical sport for decades. Type, or strong identity theory, was the target of Putnam’s original multiple realizability (MR) argument and asserts that because mental types are multiply realized by several different physical types, no lawlike identity relation between mental and physical types exists. Both psychology and neuroscience have made rapid progress in the intervening years, allowing for more empirically-guided ways of exploring their mutual explanatory value to each other. I briefly discuss the historical impact of MR, offer a diagnosis of its endurance, and revisit an earlier position I co-authored with William Bechtel. I then consider MR in light of neuroplasticity and localization, both commonly taken to support the MR argument. I argue that these not only fail in this support, but instead, show the advantage of a more empirically-grounded approach based on structure–function relationships. In this light, MR itself may even be regarded as a kind of neuro-psychological discovery principle; discovering a function that appears to be subserved by multiple neuromechanisms may point us toward interesting commonalities, rather than differences, of neurological structure.