Common Knowledge Attainability: A Response to Lederman’s Sailboat Argument

Xiao, Renjia
Acta Analytica · Springer Nature · 2026-12-01 · DOI: 10.1007/s12136-026-00705-2

Abstract

Common knowledge requires that everyone knows a proposition, knows that everyone knows it, and so on. Lederman’s Sailboat Argument claims that ideal agents may fail to attain common knowledge. The argument appeals to small differences in how a mast may appear to two agents. Its key premise says that an agent who sees the mast as having a certain height cannot rule out its appearing slightly shorter to the other agent. This paper rejects that premise. Perceptual closeness between two apparent heights does not establish that the lower appearance remains epistemically possible for that agent. Such a possibility must be tied to the epistemic state produced by the agent’s own observation. A revised premise that makes this connection may apply to an apparent height delivered by an agent’s observation, but not to lower apparent heights generated by reasoning rather than observation. The argument therefore fails.

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