Financial conglomerates in the European Banking Union: cross-sector coordination frictions in crisis management frameworks
Abstract
This article examines how the interaction between the European bank and insurance resolution frameworks shapes the resolution of financial conglomerates within the Banking Union. Although both regimes draw on common international standards and share certain conceptual foundations, their institutional architectures differ significantly. Bank resolution is centralised under the Single Resolution Board, whereas insurance resolution, introduced by the Insurance Recovery and Resolution Directive (IRRD), remains nationally administered. Using a structured scenario analysis of bank-led, insurance-led and holding-led conglomerates under alternative distress configurations, the article identifies the structural mechanisms that condition cross-sector coordination. It shows that coordination frictions arise not from the malfunctioning of sector-specific tools, but from four structural sources embedded in the two regimes: (i) the allocation of competences and the absence of a lead resolution authority, (ii) the sequencing of resolution actions and divergent intervention timelines, (iii) asymmetries in loss absorption capacity and funding arrangements, and (iv) differences in valuation frameworks. These frictions limit the design of coherent group-wide strategies and tend to produce parallel rather than integrated resolution outcomes. The findings suggest that improving cross-sector consistency does not exclusively depend on full institutional unification, but on the extent to which existing frameworks can align planning, sequencing and decision-making processes. On this basis, the article identifies three possible trajectories for strengthening cross-sector consistency: the introduction of a group-level coordination layer, the formalisation of joint planning and resolution colleges, and incremental convergence through practice-based cooperation.