Quantised Spacetime and the Case against Actual Infinities
Аннотация
The philosophical case against actual infinities, exemplified by William Lane Craig's arguments for the finitude of the past and Alexander Pruss's causal finitism, is frequently regarded as metaphysically suggestive but empirically unsubstantiated — a set of intuition pumps with limited bearing on physical reality. This paper argues that contemporary quantised-spacetime research programmes make that case answerable to physical enquiry. Loop quantum gravity, causal dynamical triangulations, and superfluid vacuum theory, each independently motivated, converge on the hypothesis that the world has a discrete microstructure: a minimum length, quantised geometric spectra, quantised circulation, and finite nucleation barriers. None is confirmed, and none has yet yielded a finding that supports finitism. Assessed within an explicit conditional framework — if one or more of these programmes proves correct, then the finitist conclusion receives independent support — the convergence shows that conclusion to be an open empirical question rather than an idle one, without making it depend on any single physical theory. A second argument inverts the cosmological perspective: read realistically, the initial singularity of standard Big Bang cosmology is itself an actual infinity, so a finitist who rests the case on singularity cosmology conflicts with their own commitments; and if a phase-transition cosmology proves correct, in which the universe nucleates from a prior vacuum state, the argument's beginning survives without invoking an infinite quantity. The bearing identified attaches to the finitist conclusion itself, not to the contested paradox-based route, and so survives ongoing debate over causal finitism.