Background Information as a Key to Resolving the Gettier Problem: Insights from Bayesian Confirmation Theory
Abstract
This paper attempts to dissolve the Gettier problem by employing the notion of background information developed within Bayesian confirmation theory. The paper ultimately defends the traditional Justified True Belief (JTB) analysis of knowledge. The central argument of the paper is that all Gettier cases, as well as several counterexamples to the No False Grounds (NFG) condition, invariably involve falsehood: either the hypothesis itself is false or the justificatory grounds are false, thereby undermining justification. However, in order to identify the precise proposition functioning as the hypothesis or as an evidential statement, and in order to evaluate its truth value, we require a conceptual category called background information . I argue that the failure to specify background information precisely is what prevents epistemologists from identifying the relevant falsehood operative in Gettier cases, whether it concerns a false hypothesis or false justificatory grounds. In many Gettier cases, we fail to recognize that the justified hypothesis is false because two distinct propositions are involved, even though they are expressed by the same sentence. The proposition that is justified is not the same proposition that ultimately turns out to be true. This implicit shift from one proposition to another frequently goes unnoticed because epistemological discussions have largely underestimated the role of background information in determining the proposition expressed by a statement. Every statement, whether explicitly or implicitly, is associated with background information, and changes in the associated background information may alter the proposition expressed by the statement itself. In addition to the notion of background information, the paper also employs the idea of the logical structure of propositions in order to diagnose and dissolve Gettier cases.